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Abstract
The collapse of New Order regime was caused by the Asian financial crisis with the crisis of 
confidence by Suharto and his political cronies. The origin of the Indonesian crisis situated 
in the effort to maintain foreign financial capital could not restore the deficit of the national 
market, while they also tried to keep the stability of fixed exchange rate. Under Suharto, Indo-
nesia was ruled by the military dual-function system and authoritarianism. Popular uprising, 
pillages, and demonstrations arose in the breakdown of New Order. The aim of this paper is 
to analyze the rational choice theory of New Order regime and the social solidarity of the 
popular uprising in the Indonesian people. By the attempt to scrutinize the New Order regime, 
there are some questions need to be asked. Firstly, how was the emergence and his political 
scheme in the history of Indonesia? Secondly, why the Asian Financial Crisis brought Suharto 
and New Order regime into its downfall? and thirdly, what was the effect of mob violence that 
appeared in 1998? Through these questions, rational choice institutionalism and social soli-
darity will be the approaches to delve the analysis of New Order regime by differentiate the 
governmental, national and international scale of the study.
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Introduction
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 
brought Indonesia into its turmoil by 
the collapse of the New Order regime. 
Corruption, collusion and nepotism led 
Indonesia into its downfall, where the 
regime of Suharto “lived by foreign 
capital and it died by foreign capital” 
(Roosa, 2008). By the leadership under 
Suharto, Indonesia was ruled for 32 
years with the authoritarianism and 
the military dual-function system. 
Political cronies and crisis of confidence 
worsened the political and economic 
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control in the national scale. Although 
on the perspective of foreign investors, 
they kept confidence that the Indonesian 
technocrats could overcome the 
financial storm, but it was directly 
opposed their expectations. The crisis 
hardly hit the country’s economic and 
political spheres. By January 1st, 1998 
the nominal value of rupiah was only 
30 percent and many of Indonesian 
companies went bankrupt, because of 
“the short-term offshore loans in US 
dollars” (Indonesia Investment, 2017). 
Economic crisis and large scale of 
corruption led the Indonesian people 
into popular uprising in the beginning 
of 1998. Demonstrations, pillages, and 
mass killings caused the breakdown on 
the New Order period.
The aim of this paper is to 
analyze the rational choice theory 
of New Order regime and the social 
solidarity of the popular uprising in 
the Indonesian people. Under the 
leadership of Suharto, United States 
encouraged him to liberalized the 
financial system of Indonesia in the 
late 1980s by opening up to foreign 
capital, unbinding regulations, and 
abolishing the government negligence” 
(Roosa, 2008). The loophole of the 
Indonesian economy was the practice 
of rent-seeking – a new way of stealing 
money - by the Jakarta’s business 
oligarchs that caused vulnerability to 
sudden change in international capital 
flows. This scheme collapsed with the 
Asian economic crisis in 1997 that the 
money flooded out from the kleptocrats 
and their phony banks” (Roosa, 2008). 
By the attempt to scrutinize the New 
Order regime, there are some questions 
need to be asked. Firstly, how was the 
emergence and his political scheme 
in the history of Indonesia? Secondly, 
why the Asian Financial Crisis brought 
Suharto and New Order regime into 
its downfall? and thirdly, what was the 
effect of mob violence that appeared in 
1998? Through these questions, rational 
choice institutionalism and social 
solidarity will be the approaches to 
delve the analysis of New Order regime 
by differentiate the governmental, 
national and international scale of the 
study.
Theoretical Approach: Rational 
Choice Theory and Social Solidar-
ity
In analyzing the paradigm on the 
collapse of the New Order, there are 
two theoretical approaches that will be 
used in this research i.e. rational choice 
theory and social solidarity as the 
measurement of the events. According 
to B. Guy Peters, rational choice theory 
is centered in the individual or the 
main political leaders, in which the 
nature of rational choice institution is 
amorphous and egoistic that the first 
principal of the motivation is his action. 
Whereby the basis of the approach is a 
“common set of assumption, common 
set of problems and tabula rasa” (Peters, 
1999) that the aim of an individual unite 
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into the institution is to fulfill his own 
political desire. Israel Gohberg states 
that “the rules of the game in this view 
are provided by the players themselves, 
they are simply the ways in which the 
players want to play” (Shepsle, 2006). 
In this term, the game theory can be 
described as a game between actors 
(legislators) to seek a mutual advantage 
to the other actors (bureaucrats self-
interest) (Peters, 1999). The bureaucrats 
presupposes do not have an evil deeds, 
they only want to pursue their own 
interest of political desire which usually 
led to the issue of corruption. In this 
approach, individual has an autonomous 
state that he does not restricted by the 
formal or informal institutions, but they 
make their own choices. The utility 
of an individual is the focal point of 
this approach by seeing his action as 
a product of individual’s interest that 
are less observed to his responsibility 
as a political actor. Moreover, the 
instrumentalist is one of the factor to 
define rational choice approach by 
focusing on the decision making and 
the origin of power to be the center 
of political life. The traditional ways 
of life, such as rituals, symbols and 
ceremonies are less affected in decision 
making in regard of this approach, 
(March and Olsen, 1984) because the 
main actor has the absolute power of its 
dynamic. 
In addition to the individual 
approach, Michael Hechter relates 
rational choice theory to social 
solidarity as a concept that individual 
members has the dependency to 
a group cohesion. In his work on 
Principles of Group Solidarity, he 
states that “individuals are seen to 
coalesce into solidary groups – such as 
collective conscious classes or ethnic 
groups – by virtue of sharing common 
material interests. They learn of this 
commonality of interest as they interact 
with one another. But, in this view, 
solidarity does not arise merely from 
the existence and awareness of common 
interest. Instead, it must be forged 
in competition with the antagonistic 
interests of individuals in groups located 
elsewhere in the social structure” 
(Hechter, 1988). His viewpoint of 
solidarity is in a structuralist perspective 
that the solidary group is being an 
opposition to the other group. For 
Sally J. Scholz, social solidarity has 
the moral obligations that are imposed 
to others in the group membership and 
do not have the purpose for relieving 
oppression and/or injustice (Scholz, 
1992). This statement is strengthened 
by Durkheim that the form of collective 
consciousness is the stem of the 
authoritative state, where it becomes the 
symbol of autonomy and “capable of 
producing its own spontaneous actions” 
(Scholz, 1992). It never frees itself 
by the source of its authority, where 
collective consciousness is controlling 
the authority of determining the notion 
of social acts. Therefore, rational choice 
theory is used as the measurement of 
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analyzing the leadership of Suharto and 
his political approach, whereas social 
solidarity scrutinize the popular uprising 
on the collapse of New Order regime.
The New Order Regime: Suharto’s 
Political Approach
In the event on the massacre of 
Indonesian Communist Party members 
(Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI) in 
1965, Suharto could gained political 
power from the Indonesian Armed 
Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia/ABRI) and the support from 
the Western states (Ricklefs, 2001). 
The alignment of ABRI into the contra-
revolutionary in the period of Sukarno 
happened by the political competition 
between the PKI and ABRI itself. The 
peak of the conflict happened when the 
PKI members were accused killing 6 
Generals of ABRI on 4 October 1965 
and the “Untung Coup” that destructed 
the triangular relationship of President 
Sukarno, the PKI and the armed forces. 
Suharto as one of the Major General 
led the troops to arrest and kill the PKI 
members across Indonesia. He was the 
supreme commander of the Indonesian 
Armed Force and he could promote and 
demote military officers (Suryadinata, 
1997). He used his political rights to 
build his authoritarian regime under 
the military power. With the absolute 
political power of Suharto, Pancasila is 
the foundation of Indonesian ideology 
and its philosophy. Pancasila is known 
as the five principles that came from 
the Sanskrit word (Old Javanese word) 
of “pañca” (five)and sīla (principles). 
The five principles can be described 
as follows: (1) Believe in One God; 
(2) Just and Civilized Humanity 
[humanitarianism]; (3) The Unity of 
Indonesia [nationalism]; (4) Democracy 
guided by the inner wisdom in the 
unanimity arising out of deliberations 
amongst representatives [democracy]; 
and (5) Social justice for all of the 
people of Indonesia [social justice] 
(Ricklefs, 2001). By following the 
ideology of Pancasila, Suharto created 
the ‘New Order’ system; contrasted 
with the ‘Old Order’ system of Sukarno.
As Geoffrey C. Gunn stated in 
his article “Ideology and the Concept 
of Government in the Indonesian 
New Order” that through Pancasila, 
the system of leadership incorporated 
the supremacy of traditional values 
into Western derived law (Gunn, 
1979). The rejuvenate of precolonial 
pattern of Javanese values had been 
the tactics for Suharto to remain in his 
political power. Cultural hegemony 
and political traditions were the 
inheritance of Indonesian leaders, 
where Suharto was playing his role as 
“the old Javanese King” (Gunn, 1979). 
The 1945 Constitution of Republic 
of Indonesia (Undang-Undang Dasar 
Republik Indonesia 1945/ UUD 1945) 
was also sacralized to increase the myth 
and symbol of Javanese hegemony 
(Anderson, 2010). Javanization was the 
nucleus of Suharto’s political power, 
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[2] the Doctrine of Civil Action, [3] the 
Doctrine of Development (Gunn, 1979). 
By referring to these doctrines, ABRI 
had a role function for being a dynamist 
and stabilizer in the Indonesian nation. 
On the one hand, the role of ABRI 
as a dynamist could be described 
by communicating with the people, 
to guide and support the society for 
participating the national development 
in the industrial and technological 
arenas. On the other hand, ABRI also 
needed to be a stabilizer and focusing 
on the social control that prevented 
the exogenous factor to influenced 
the cultural and social values of the 
Indonesian traditions.
After Suharto recreated the aim of 
ABRI as a dual-function, he elected new 
members into the Provisional People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara/
MPRS) to elect himself for the 
Presidency of a five-year term (Ricklefs, 
2001). He had shown his power to 
justify his position in the Indonesian 
political system. In the year of 1969, 
the government stabilized its economic 
progress by establishing its first Five-
Year Development Plan (Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun/Repelita I, 
from 1969 – 1974) - focusing on the 
agriculture, economic infrastructure, 
and industrial needs by asking from the 
help of IMF and the World Bank as the 
foreign loans. The technocrats consulted 
the economic development to the IMF 
by introducing and concentrated to 
surrounded by bureaucratic polity 
and high level of civil and military 
bureaucrats as the monopolized 
political participations (Gunn, 1979). 
The political rivalry centered in the 
institutional actors which were the 
bureaucrats, technocrats, and military 
elites that compete to the Suharto’s 
political circle. 
After the downfall of Old Order, 
the Indonesian Armed Force created 
a new doctrine inside the institution 
of School for Staff and Commander 
of Indonesian Armed Force (Sekolah 
Staf dan Komandan Angkatan Darat/
SESKOAD). The army’s meeting was 
held in Bandung 1966 and produced 
the guideline of Tri Ubaya Cakti 
(doctrine of struggle of the army). In 
this period, Suharto changed the aim 
of Indonesian Armed Force into Dual-
Function ABRI (Dwifungsi ABRI) that 
expanded the military power into the 
political economic arenas. Through 
the meeting, the doctrine of Tri Ubaya 
Cakti was settled and it clearly referring 
to the Old Javanese words that can be 
described as “the ubaya (promise) of 
pembangunan (development) and cakti 
(the sacred devolution of power to a 
moral and righteous force)” referred 
to the symbol General Suharto as the 
president of Indonesia and the TNI-AD 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan 
Darat / Indonesian Armed Force) as his 
guardian (Gunn, 1979). The doctrine 
consist of three principle, mainly [1] 
the Doctrine of Basic National Security, 
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the budgetary retrains, high interest 
rates, control of the export and anti-
corruption measurement. They gave 
Indonesia for US$ 877 million for the 
economic development plan (Ricklefs, 
2001). The loans increased through 
his regime by following the economic 
plan through Repelita II (1974 – 1979), 
Repelita III (1979 – 1984), Repelita 
IV (1984 – 1989), and Repelita V 
(1989 – 1994). According to the plan, 
Repelita II was focusing more on the 
transportation system and the industrial 
development across the archipelago 
through transmigrassion; Repelita III 
centered on the labor-intensive industry 
to increase the Indonesian export of 
goods and materials; Repelita IV was 
concerned in the new job opportunity 
and industry; and Repelita V 
emphasized the issue on transportation, 
communication and education (Hill, 
2000). The success of the economic 
plan brought the new order regime into 
a secure political position in the national 
level. The strong bond between Suharto 
and the military force strengthened his 
regime until 32 years of his presidency. 
The Downfall of New Order Re-
gime: Economic Crisis and IMF
The Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997/98 shockingly hit the New Order 
regime in its downfall. The origin of the 
Indonesian crisis situated in the effort 
to maintain foreign financial capital 
could not restore the deficit of the 
national market, while they also tried 
to keep the stability of fixed exchange 
rate. The Indonesian rupiah had been 
influenced by the contagion of another 
Southeast Asian currency and fall down 
until 75 percent, which was the lowest 
point of 17000 rupiahs per US$ 1 by 
the end of 1997. In the beginning of 
Indonesian economic crisis, the rupiah 
levitated from 8 per cent to 12 per cent. 
In June 1997, the rate of Indonesian 
currency changed from 2400 to 3600 
rupiahs per one dollar. In the beginning 
of January 1998, the currency falls 
down to 10 000 rupiahs and in July 
1998, the devaluation reached to 75 
per cent (Iriana and Sjöholm, 2002; 
see also Sherlock, 2017). As Jeffrey 
M. Chwieroth stated in his article, “the 
economic crisis often bring remarkable 
transformations” (Chwieroth, 2010). 
The impact of the crisis transformed the 
domestic balance of power and some 
resolution to resolve the economic 
problem. The strong domestic balance 
of Indonesian economic power centered 
in the macroeconomic level with its 
industrial and rural development, but it 
was also the characteristic of the early 
financial crisis. Referring to Charlie 
Harvie, the pre-crisis featured by strong 
economic growth, low budget deficits, 
low inflation, high domestic savings, 
a stable accumulation of foreign 
exchange with steady external debt 
service ratio (Harvie, 1999). Most of 
the investments belonged to the foreign 
loans with half of the savings owned 
by private property and designated 
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as hard currency in the form of US 
dollars and Japanese yen. As a result, 
the Indonesian government was fragile 
to the progress of exchange rate and 
it followed by the distrust of foreign 
investors and increasing creditor panic 
(Harvie, 1999). The monetary crisis led 
Indonesia to have massive reformation 
in the political, economic and social 
sphere.
The regime of Suharto lasted 
almost 32 years with a stabilized 
macroeconomic and political order. 
With the stroke of Asian financial 
crisis, his regime started to crumbled. 
The Suharto’s family, his cronies 
and the cukongs (Indonesian biggest 
entrepreneurs) were the cantilever of 
Indonesian economic foundation. The 
corruption, collusion and nepotism were 
the symbol of his regime. Corruption, 
referring Samuel P. Huntington, is 
“most prevalent in states which lack 
effective political parties, in societies 
where the interests of the individual, 
the family, the clique, or the clan’ 
predominate” (Huntington, 2006). The 
disintegration of the regime appeared 
by the fact that the nation could not 
maintained the regime that “its costs 
outweighed its benefits” (Ricklefs, 
2001). The military nepotism and 
Suharto’s favoritism resulted factions 
inside the military body. The six 
children of Suharto also enjoyed the 
luxury of Suharto’s regime by conspired 
with the political and business actors to 
gain money from the national budgets 
for their own benefit. One of the 
example of Suharto’s nepotism came 
from the scandal of Suharto’s family 
business that appeared in 1996, where 
one of Suharto’s son, Tommy Suharto, 
constructed a story that Indonesia would 
built their own car. The fact erupted to 
the public that he bought a built-up Kias 
and renamed it as Timor which could be 
called as national car. The purpose of 
this issue was to escape all the duty of 
paying taxes and to increase the profit of 
joint venture. Suharto, then, decided to 
import 45 000 Timors for the beginning 
of the contract (Ricklefs, 2001). Other 
issues influenced the economic crisis 
came from the structural rigidities 
applied in the economic structure that 
resulted from the trade restrictions, 
import monopolies and economic 
regulations (Harvie, 1999). The 
tradition of corruption also influenced 
the crisis with the lack of transparency, 
less financial liberalization, poor central 
bank governance and the accumulation 
of private sector debt. The dictatorship 
of Suharto and his lack transparency of 
the bureaucracy gave an impression that 
the Indonesian society were decreasing 
their believe in his regime. With the 
collapse of economic stability, Suharto 
tried to gather his loyal military power, 
his cronies and the cukongs for the 
support of his political domain.
The Asian Financial Crisis was 
the cause of the economic finance and 
the banking system that hit Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. 
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The crisis was not affected by the 
whole Asian regions, such as China, 
Taiwan and India that escaped the 
crisis. Through the Australian media, 
it was known as the ‘Asian economic 
crisis’ or ‘Asian financial meltdown’ 
(Sherlock, 2017). The contagion of 
Indonesian crisis was influenced by the 
other Southeast Asian nation that caused 
by fundamental links and behavior 
of financial markets. Contagion, in 
this sense, means as a “cross-country 
correlation coefficients of exchange 
rates and stock markets increase during 
the crisis” (Iriana and Sjöholm, 2002). 
The Indonesian economic crisis was 
influenced by the correlation coefficient 
from Thailand that the Thai’s stock 
market was relatively high which 
resulted to the Indonesian stock market. 
It was a diverse case with the relation of 
Indonesia-Malaysia, that there was no 
sign of contagion between them.
By the collapse of Indonesian 
economic stability, Suharto seek help 
to the international organization of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
October 1997. Firstly, the IMF issued 
a rescue package of US$ 23 billion to 
rescue the Indonesian currency and 
its financial market with the help of 
World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank. Secondly, IMF agreed to 
prevent economic disintegration by 
eliminating the support of aircraft 
industry, limitation on the Indonesian 
trade monopoly of rice imports, and 
deregulation of domestic products 
(Sherlock, 2017). The central point 
of IMF to help the economic crisis 
was the restructuration of Indonesian 
banks, securing the foreign investment, 
deregulation and privatization, and 
social safety net. For the government’s 
duty, they need to secure the cheap 
loans for the middle class entrepreneurs 
(Tjoptonerijanto, 2017). Unfortunately, 
the program that IMF seek to apply in 
Indonesian market could not stabilized 
the Indonesian currency. In his final 
decision, Suharto tried to maintain 
his political regime in his fragile 
relationship with his political cronies.
The Indonesian Crisis: Popular 
Uprising 
The Asian Financial Crisis brought 
the Indonesians into poverty. The high 
rate of living cost, food shortage and 
mass unemployment increased its peak 
between 1997 and 1998 that followed 
by the uprising of Indonesian people. 
The demonstrates – most of them were 
students - rejected the leadership of 
Suharto as the Indonesian President in 
1998 that led to the starting point of 
reformation. This movement echoed 
the refusal on the seventh re-election of 
Suharto being president in the General 
Assembly of People’s Consultative 
Assembly March 10th, 1998. It became 
tragedy in May 12th, 1998 when ABRI 
repressively handled the students from 
University of Trisakti. Four students 
were killed in the Trisakti’s tragedy 
and 681 people were injured (Ricklefs, 
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2001; Galih, 2019). By the death of the 
students, the mass violence increased in 
the following days. 
The downfall of Suharto’s regime 
was in the peak, with the collapse of 
economic development, the ABRI 
brutality, and the unreachable for 
reformation brought the Indonesian 
people into massive riots. In May 
18th, 1998 students from Indonesia 
University started to move to the House 
of Representative to join with students 
from other universities. The Long 
March symbolized a social key with 
a coded map, e.g. the main street of 
Salemba and Matraman are occupied 
with the mixed working-class and high 
density on the presence of high school 
and universities; Kampung Melayu 
and Manggarai are populated by poor 
urban working-class; the elite areas of 
Thamrin and Sudirman were defended 
from activist occupation by the armed 
forces (Lee, 2016). According to 
Doreen Lee, the energy of urban poor 
and dissatisfied young men resulted the 
realization of the demo’s success. Space 
in this term referred to the discourse of 
student movement, where the people 
gathered and student activists started 
the mass demonstration. The slogan 
of “Turun ke jalan!” (Descend to the 
streets!) had been used for the activists 
to assemble their troops into the streets 
(Lee, 2016). ““Turun ke jalan” was 
especially effective at conveying 
students’ descent from the ivory tower 
of the university, which had become 
a privileged and depoliticized zone 
for furthering New Order technocratic 
aims”. (Weiss and Aspinal cited in Lee, 
2016) In this notion, the appearance 
of Durkheim’s theory of solidarity 
described the people become as a 
collective apparition that the individuals 
has seen themselves as subject of 
political discourse (Lee, 2016). 
Enthusiasm of the student movement 
with the right of political will and 
conditions of preparation led the urban 
people into an assemblage. Therefore, 
people would join the demonstration 
led by the confidence of student 
activists reflected the will of moral and 
reformation. Until May 19th, 1998 the 
students, the urban middle and lower 
classes took control over the House of 
Representative in which they demanded 
that Suharto needed to stepped down 
from his throne. The Chairman of the 
Legislative and People’s Consultative 
Assembly, Harmoko, publicly stated 
that “in response to the urgent situation, 
the Council of the Chairman hoped, for 
the sake of national unity and integrity, 
that the President should resign.” 
(Galih, 2019) Suharto felt cornered 
that most of his cronies left him and 
the number of the demonstrators 
significantly increased. In May 18th, 
1998 Suharto finally resigned as the 
President of Indonesia.
Conclusion
The history of New Order is 
influencing the development of its 
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government by the inertia of power 
domination and corruption through 
the political sphere. By picturing the 
events, rational choice institutionalism 
centered in Suharto as a person and the 
main actor of the regime. In the period 
from 1967 to 1998,  path dependency 
is suitable for analyzing Suharto’s 
political background and his policy 
according to the 1965 incident of 
Indonesian Communist Party members 
and the deprivation of Sukarno as the 
first Indonesian president. His role as 
an old Javanese King gave himself the 
absolute power in Indonesia, although 
he applied democracy and Pancasila in 
the foundation of Indonesian ideology. 
The theoretical basis is based on the 
utilitarian and instrumentalism, that 
the rule of the game is centered in 
Suharto himself. His decision making 
and the corrupt governmental system 
was the design of his institution that 
brought him into his downfall. The 
Asian Economic Crisis was the turning 
point of his period, by asking the 
help of IMF to restore the economic 
stability. His institution was filled by 
corruption, collusion and nepotism that 
worsened the economic and political 
sphere. Whereas social solidarity 
narrates the symbol of the action by 
analyzing the popular uprising in the 
period of the downfall of New Order 
regime. In this stage, the transformation 
of evolution happened in the period 
of demonstration, where the peak of 
the event occurred in 1998. The death 
of the students was the catalyzer of 
the massive mobs across Indonesian 
regions. Another aspect also came from 
the Suharto’s family corruption, his 
cronies and the cukongs that conducted 
collusion and nepotism. The effect of 
these cause correlates to the anger of 
Indonesian people which transformed 
into massive strike. Transformation 
on the individual act that resulted as a 
mob of demonstrations is a production 
of sociological institutions, where the 
society culminated their unsatisfying 
desire into revolutionary movement.[]
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